Pel-Air revisited – The ditching of Australian aviation governance Part 1

Comments (11)

• 

  William Mulloy

  says:

  April 15, 2018 at 1:21 am

  Wow ! Gripping article . I am from Canada and am now retired after 40 years of flying . I think back of how lucky I am to have survived through my career . My last 30 years were for the most part influenced by a good safety culture oversite from Transport Canada at the airline I flew for but I can say this ; my first 10 years of bush flying ; charter flights & medevac flights where there was very little oversite from either your management or higher ups & I was virtually on my own and doing everything myself ( most of that time single pilot ) on aircraft like Mitsubishi MU-2 & piper PA-31 it is a wonder I managed to keep an unblemished track record . I know that I was extremely lucky because I can tell you this : I scared the hell out of myself more than once & I put myself there but I sometimes think if ther was a bit more oversite in my small company I wouldn’t have exposed myself to several of the questionable situations that I ended up in . Anyway thank you for reading my letter as I have nothing but compassion for those pilots & pax in your article . I really feel for those pilots because I know they set out with the best of intentions in that westwind & other factors helped put them where they ended up . I hope to see the film if it is ever produced. Thank you from Captain W Mulloy CRJ-900 .

• 

  James

  says:

  April 15, 2018 at 2:03 pm

  Great article Ben. Every pilot involved in IFR charter should be all over this incident.

• 

  Jaco

  says:

  April 15, 2018 at 8:07 pm

  Great article. I’ve followed this accident since it happened back in 2009. To be honest when I first read the few sketchy details about the accident I had my own biased opinions about what might have happened.
  But as more details emerged with the investigation and then the review of that investigation, this accident has proved to be a treasure trove of really good points that everyone in aviation can take away and learn from no matter what sort of organisation you might be involved in.
  As Ben pointed out in his article, this accident touches on a very wide range of issues and I sincerely hope that we can all learn from it.
  I feel genuinely sorry for the people involved. Like all of us they tried to do the most professional job with the tools they had in the situation that presented itself.
  Thank you for the article, Ben. Really well written. Cannot wait for the next one.

• 

  David East

  says:

  April 15, 2018 at 10:01 pm

  Thanks for the very well researched and written account of this accident. I remember it well. I was in a room of professional aviators and we all scoffed at how the crew must have stuffed up. After reading what Human Factors contributed, it’s a strong reminder that passing judgement does not help one little bit. Knowing all of the facts, knowing how well the ditching was handled and communicated, how this all contributed to the crew and passengers being rescued. We all make mistakes, for many reasons. Some have no repercussions, some clearly do. Well done to all involved and very sorry to hear of the patient passing due to PTSD.
  I look forward to the follow on article.

• 

  Sandy Reith

  says:

  April 16, 2018 at 5:07 am

  Ben Cook has written a highly descriptive story with some interesting analysis.
  But with respect there might be other judgements that go right to the most critical element of cause. Quote:-
  “exacerbates the upcoming problems for this crew: some critical weather information was either passed incorrectly or not at all.”
  This surely is the question; and if “not at all” or “incorrectly” is true then surely it is very difficult to see that any appreciable blame should fall on the shoulders of the crew. Reading other analysis by PAIN contributors at the AuntyPru website, with time lines, it seems that if certain weather reports had been passed to the crew then they would have had reason, and sufficient fuel, for a diversion to an alternate airport.
  Thus a failure to communicate critical weather information did not “exacerbate the upcoming problems” because to that point there was no problem(s).
  In which case it then might also follow to give less weight to sleep deprivation as a factor of cause, though obvious enough that proper procedures seemed to be lacking and corrective action was called for.

• 

  Bob Grimstead

  says:

  April 17, 2018 at 12:34 pm

  As a lifelong professional airman and 35-year aviation journalist I can say this is one of the best and most balanced articles I have ever read about what was clearly a poorly-conducted accident investigation.
  A few years ago I was asked to provide expert opinion on another ATSB investigation and also found it unprofessional and heavily biased towards blaming the inexperienced pilot rather than his chief pilot whom he was following at very low level over hostile terrain in a single-engined aircraft.
  I applaud your campaign Ben, to get a balanced view of the events and systems leading to this accident.

• 

  Peter

  says:

  April 17, 2018 at 4:14 pm

  Wow, what a great review of the Pel Air ditching by Ben Cook. I know the investigation was a shambles. I am looking forward to Part 2.

• 

  James

  says:

  April 17, 2018 at 4:18 pm

  @ Bob Grimstead
  Very well said. I always enjoyed reading your articles in AA. I learnt quite a bit from your golf course landing a few years back.
  Hope to see some more articles from you moving forward.

• 

  Peter J CESNIK (QF Staff no 553370 /02/06/71 - now retired

  says:

  April 17, 2018 at 5:49 pm

  Great and sobering article……

• 

  Paul

  says:

  April 20, 2018 at 6:58 pm

  @Bob Grimstead Can you say which investigation that was please?

• 

  Ian Sawley

  says:

  April 23, 2018 at 9:38 pm

  Great article. I have a son flying for Adria in Europe and there is a number of lessons he could learn from this.

Comments are closed.